Protecting refineries, substations and tank farms from UAVs

Energy is one of the most difficult classes of objects to counter UAVs. The area is measured in kilometers, the perimeter does not have a clear boundary, and electromagnetic interference cannot be created near technological equipment. At the same time, stopping production during an attack is unacceptable: the facility must work while the system repels the threat.

How does energy differ from other objects?

• Explosion hazard zones Tank farms and technological installations require special rules for the use of means of destruction.
• Electromagnetic compatibilityPowerful REM can affect instrumentation, SCADA, communications and GPS synchronization.
• Continuity of productionDeployment and maintenance cannot be stopped for weeks.
• Large perimeter One position does not cover the tank farm, open switchgear and administrative area at the same time.
• Regulatory requirements The use of means of influence is consistent with the safety rules of the facility.

Passive protection: what does it really cover?

Nets, enclosures, protective glazing and screens reduce the likelihood of damage to specific elements. They are cheap, non-interfering and work without power. But passive protection does not stop reconnaissance: a drone can film an object from a safe distance and then transmit data for a strike.

Passive tools also add operational complexity: networks need to be maintained and affect visibility and operation of equipment. Therefore, at a power facility, passive protection is considered as an addition to active protection, and not as its replacement.

Active protection: three tasks

The active system solves three problems: detect a target on the approaches, confirm its type and apply a means acceptable for a specific zone. For the energy sector, the separation of zones is especially important: laser and interception have priority over the tank farm, and optics and electronic electronic devices with a limited sector have priority over the open switchgear.

Scenario: attack on a substation

A typical scenario begins with a reconnaissance mission: a commercial quadcopter flies over the perimeter and shoots exposed switchgear. The FPV drone can then hit the insulators or transformer. The approach height is 20–100 m, the approach time from a distance of 2 km is about a minute.

The system must detect the target before approach, confirm it with optics and apply the remedy before it enters the restricted area. If EPR is unacceptable due to the impact on equipment, laser jamming and interception remain. If they are also limited, the only solution remains passive protection and organizational measures.

Scenario: attack on a tank farm

Reservoirs with petroleum products are a large thermal and optical target. The loitering munition can be launched from above using a thermal imaging head. Passive nets and screens reduce the likelihood of a direct hit, but do not eliminate the threat. The active system must operate at distant approaches to prevent the carrier from entering the drop zone.

For tank farms, early detection is especially important: the more time it takes to confirm and influence, the less likely the drone will be to reach its target. Radar and optical-electronic search systems give this head start; laser and interception realize the final frontier.

Electromagnetic compatibility

A powerful REB is not a universal solution for an energy facility. Its emissions can affect sensors, communications and GPS synchronization. Therefore, before deployment, frequency windows, directivity and exclusion zones are calculated. In some cases, the electronic transmission system is used only in certain sectors or is switched off for the duration of technological operations.

Deployment without stopping production

1. Inspection and 3D model without stopping the object.
2. Installation of supports and cable routes in night windows.
3. Phased introduction of sensors: first detection, then tools.
4. Commissioning and training of operators using real scenarios.
5. Trial operation with recording of false alarms and reaction time.